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Abstract
We address the twin puzzles of anomalously low returns for high idiosyncratic
volatility and high distress risk stocks, documented by Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang
(2006) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005), respectively. We accomplish
two objectives in this study. First, we investigate the link between idiosyncratic
volatility and distress risk and find that the idiosyncratic volatility effect exists only
conditionally on high distress risk. Second, using a corrected single-beta CAPM
model, we provide a rational explanation for the twin puzzles. Joint statistical tests
cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns across the idiosyncratic
volatility and distress risk portfolios, for the corrected model.
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1 Introduction
Distress, bankruptcy, default, and volatility–these terms are often synonymous with finan-
cial hardship. Yet studies of these topics reveal mixed messages and anomalies. It is crucial
to understand these concepts, since they relate to the smooth functioning of financial mar-
kets, an issue that affects institutional investors, governments and individuals alike.
In this paper we examine distress and idiosyncratic volatility effects, and propose a
rational explanation to two puzzles. Recent research on distress and idiosyncratic volatility
has uncovered several fundamental puzzles, two in particular on which we focus. First, Ang,
Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2005) discover, unexpectedly, that stocks with high idiosyncratic
volatility relative to the Fama-French (1993) model earn anomalously low returns. At the
same time, there have been similar findings in another line of research focusing on the effect
of bankruptcy (distress) risk on stock returns. For example, Dichev (1998) and Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2005) document that stocks with high likelihood of distress receive
anomalously low returns. This suggests that some risky (distressed) stocks do not receive
compensatory returns.
There is an intuitive reason to believe that these two puzzles are related to each other.
According to the Merton (1974) model, corporate debt is a risk-free bond less a put option
on the value of the firm’s assets, with strike price of the face value of the debt. Thus, a
firm with more volatile equity is more likely to reach the boundary condition for default.
Based on this argument, Campbell and Taksler (2003) show that idiosyncratic firm-level
volatility can explain a significant part of cross-sectional variation in corporate bond yields.
Given the evidence that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility receive anomalously low
returns, it may be possible that the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is just an expression of
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the distress risk puzzle.
We first investigate the link between the idiosyncratic volatility effect and distress ef-
fect by sequential sorting. We proxy for firms’ distress risk by Altman’s (1968) Z-score
and Ohlson’s (1980) O-score. We control for the distress effect by first sorting stocks into
quintiles according to their Z-score or O-score, then within each quintile, sorting again
into portfolios based on firms’ idiosyncratic volatility. After controlling for distress risk,
stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility earn significantly lower returns than low idiosyn-
cratic volatility stocks, only in the highest distress risk quintile. This result confirms our
conjecture that the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is closely related to the distress effect.
In other words, the idiosyncratic volatility effect exists conditional on high distress risk.
Our first contribution here is to establish a bridge between the idiosyncratic volatility and
distress risk puzzles.
After we build this bridge, we move forward to investigate an appealing, rational expla-
nation for the twin puzzles. For this purpose, we apply a methodology based on the work
of Ferguson and Shockley (2003). Following the line of Roll’s (1977) critique, Ferguson and
Shockley (2003) observe that using an equity-only proxy for the market portfolio will un-
derstate equity betas, and that this understatement is an increasing and convex function of
firm leverage. Due to this convexity, the beta estimation error should be more pronounced
for more distressed firms. It then follows that in the cross section, the equity beta estima-
tion errors will not be random. They will be systematically related to the relative leverage
and relative distress of each firm in the sample. As a result, the model predicts that firm
leverage and financial distress will capture the convex beta estimation errors induced by
the use of an equity-only market proxy.
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Our approach here is to apply a corrected single-beta CAPM model to address the
issue of anomalously low returns on the most volatile and most distressed stocks. It turns
out that when we use the corrected single-beta CAPM to adjust stock returns, the spread
between high and low idiosyncratic volatility stocks, and spread between high and low dis-
tress risk stocks become insignificantly different from zero. Moreover, the test of Gibbons,
Ross and Shanken (GRS, 1989) cannot jointly reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal
returns across the idiosyncratic volatility portfolios and distress risk portfolios. The second
contribution in our paper, therefore, is to provide a rational explanation to the idiosyncratic
volatility puzzle and distress risk puzzle.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the link between
the idiosyncratic volatility and distress risk puzzles. We do sequential sorting to examine
the idiosyncratic volatility effect, controlling for distress risk, and vice versa. We thereby
forge a link between the idiosyncratic volatility and distress risk puzzles. In Section 3, we
develop a simple, rational explanation for the twin puzzles. Specifically, we use a corrected
single-beta CAPM model to adjust stock returns and implement joint statistical tests to
determine whether the model can explain the abnormal returns across the idiosyncratic
volatility portfolios and distress risk portfolios. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical relationship between the idiosyncratic volatil-
ity and distress risk effects
This section is devoted to studying the link between the idiosyncratic volatility and distress
effects on the cross-section of stock returns. As mentioned above, Ang, Hodrick, Xing
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and Zhang (2005) discover that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility earn low returns.
Specifically, the return differential between low- and high-idiosyncratic volatility stocks is
1.31% per month. This result holds even after controlling for aggregate volatility risk, size,
book-to-market, momentum, coskewness, dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, and liquidity
effects. A parallel finding exists in the distress risk literature. In particular, several papers
on distress risk document that firms with high likelihood of distress also receive anomalously
low returns (see for example, Dichev (1998) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005)).
These puzzles are related to each other. Consider the Merton (1974) formalization
of corporate debt as a risk-free bond less a put option on the value of firm assets, with
strike price of the face value of the debt. Consequently, a firm with more volatile equity
is more likely to reach the boundary for default. Developing this logic, Campbell and
Taksler (2003) show that idiosyncratic firm-level volatility explains a significant part of
cross-sectional variation in corporate bond yields.
Our insight is to develop this logic even further. In particular, we recognize that stocks
with high idiosyncratic volatility have two empirical features and an important theoretical
feature. The two empirical features are low returns (from Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang
(2003)), and a strong relation to the return on corporate bonds (from Campbell and Taksler
(2003)). The theoretical feature, as mentioned above, is that high volatility corresponds to
an increased likelihood of default or distress. Combining these theoretical and empirical
features, it is a plausible conjecture that the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle might simply
reflect distress risk.
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2.1 Definition of idiosyncratic volatility and distress risk
Our measures of idiosyncratic volatility and distress risk are similar to those used in the
literature. Regarding idiosyncratic volatility, we use the same approach as Ang, Hodrick,
Xing and Zhang (2005). That is, we estimate idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama
and French (1993) model as follows:
rit = α
i + βiMKTMKTt + β
i
SMBSMBt + β
i
HMLHMLt + 
i
t (1)
The idiosyncratic volatility is then
√
var(it).
Regarding distress risk measures, we use Altman’s (1968) Z-score and Ohlson’s (1980)
O-score. These two models are popular frameworks for bankruptcy prediction and have
been widely used in empirical research and practice. For example, Griffin and Lemmon
(2002) use O-score to examine the relationship between book-to-market equity, distress
risk, and stock returns. Dichev (1998) investigates whether the risk of bankruptcy is a
systematic risk using Z-score and O-score. Indeed, both Z-score and O-score are good
for sensitivity analysis since they are derived in different time periods, using different
independent variables and different predictive methodologies. The definitions are as follows.
Z-score is given by:
Z = 1.2
working capital
total assets
+ 1.4
retained earnings
total assets
+ 3.3
earnings before interest and taxes
total assets
+0.6
market value of equity
book value of total liabilities
+ 1.0
sales
total assets
.
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Ohlson’(1980) O score is defined as:
O = −1.32− 0.407log(total assets) + 6.03total liabilities
total assets
− 1.43working capital
total assets
+0.076
current liabilities
current assets
− 1.72(1 if total liabilities > total assets, else 0)
−2.37 net income
total assets
− 1.83funds from operations
total liabilities
+ 0.285(1 if net loss
for last two years, else 0)− 0.521 net incomet − net incomet−1|net incomet|+ |net incomet−1| .
Both of these models are quite accurate in predicting bankruptcy. From the definition of
Z-score and O-score, we know that Z-score is a measure of financial strength, in the sense
that higher Z means lower probability of bankruptcy, and O-score is a measure of financial
distress(higher O means higher probability of bankruptcy).
Both Altman’s and Ohlson’s models are derived for industrials, so our sample consists
of all industrial firms available simultaneously on the NYSE, AMEX CRSP tapes and the
COMPUSTAT annual industrial and research tapes for the period of 1981 to 2005. Since
COMPUSTAT discontinues reporting the data item of firms’ funds from operations after
2000, we limit our O-score sample to the period from 1981 to 2000. The average number of
firms per year in our study is 1036 firms for Z-score, and 1124 firms for O-score. The reason
for restricting our sample to post-1980 years is that Ohlson’s model becomes available in
1980, and the post-1980 years contain substantially more CRSP-COMPUSTAT matched
firms for our study of distress risk. Data in Altman (1993) also show that the rate of
insolvency and business failure has dramatically increased since about 1980.
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Table 1: Cross-sectional idiosyncratic volatility effect controlled for distress risk.
Panel A presents the idiosyncratic volatility effect controlling for the Z-score. In ”Before
Controlling” row, each June from 1981 to 2005, firms are sorted into five quintiles according
to their idiosyncratic volatility from equation(1) using daily data in the past year. In
”Controlling for Z-score” panel, in June of each year, stocks are first sorted into five quintiles
according to their previous December Z-score. Within each quintile, stocks are then sorted
into five groups on the basis of their idiosyncratic volatility for the past year. Portfolios
are value-weighted. The abnormal returns(in percentage) adjusted by FF-3 model and
associated robust Newey-West(1997) t-statistics are reported. The column ”5-1” refers to
the difference in monthly abnormal returns between portfolio 5(the portfolio of stocks with
highest idiosyncratic volatility) and portfolio 1 (the lowest idiosyncratic volatility portfolio).
Panel B repeats the same procedure using O-score. The sample period is from 1981 to 2000.
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on idiosyncratic volatility controlling for the Z-score
Ranking on Idiosyncratic Volatility
Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 5-1
Before 0.16 -0.04 -0.47 -0.32 -0.44 -0.60
Controlling [1.49] [-0.29] [-3.74] [-1.69] [-1.71] [-2.05]
Low Z1 -0.48 -0.94 -0.94 -1.03 -1.56 -1.08
Controlling [-2.78] [-4.14] [-2.99] [-3.10] [-3.15] [-2.07]
2 -0.09 -0.08 -0.37 -0.22 -0.58 -0.49
for [-0.58] [-0.41] [-1.81] [-0.84] [-1.50] [-1.24]
3 0.04 -0.20 -0.42 -0.59 -0.34 -0.38
Z-score [0.29] [-1.22] [-2.16] [-2.50] [-1.07] [-1.11]
4 0.23 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.44 -0.66
[1.82] [-0.21] [-0.12] [0.12] [-1.37] [-1.98]
High Z5 0.39 0.17 -0.19 -0.41 -0.31 -0.70
[2.53] [0.91] [-1.08] [-1.61] [-0.86] [-1.61]
Panel B: Portfolios sorted on idiosyncratic volatility controlling for the O-score
Ranking on Idiosyncratic Volatility
Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 5-1
Before 0.10 -0.13 -0.54 -0.22 -0.58 -0.67
Controlling [0.92] [-1.22] [-3.91] [-1.06] [-2.24] [-2.44]
Low O1 0.16 0.03 -0.17 -0.09 -0.11 -0.27
Controlling [1.29] [0.18] [-0.87] [-0.41] [-0.32] [-0.68]
2 0.21 -0.18 -0.29 -0.50 -0.08 -0.30
for [1.46] [-1.21] [-1.50] [-2.15] [-0.26] [-0.87]
3 0.14 -0.11 -0.57 -0.67 -0.36 -0.50
O-score [0.93] [-0.72] [-2.52] [-2.70] [-1.16] [-1.49]
4 -0.07 -0.49 -0.94 -0.85 -0.82 -0.75
[-0.35] [-2.26] [-3.78] [-2.92] [-2.20] [-1.92]
High O5 -0.33 -0.92 -0.83 -1.44 -1.43 -1.09
[-1.36] [-3.09] [-2.35] [-3.44] [-3.15] [-2.29]
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2.2 Analysis of the idiosyncratic volatility effect, controlling for
distress risk
To examine whether the idiosyncratic volatility effect is different from the distress risk
effect, we do sequential sorting according to firms’ distress risk and idiosyncratic volatility.
Specifically, we examine whether the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle exists in all distress
risk quintiles, as well as in the whole sample. The bankruptcy scores are computed from
COMPUSTAT as of the fiscal year-end of a given year t. To ensure that the accounting
data are available to calculate the distress risk measures, we delay the bankruptcy scores
by six months. In June of each year, stocks are first ranked into five distress quintiles
according to their previous December Z-score/O-score. Within each distress quintile, firms
are then sorted into five groups according to their idiosyncratic volatility from equation(1)
using daily data in the past year. For July of t through June of t + 1, the return on each
portfolio is calculated as the value-weighted average return of the stocks in the portfolio.
Table 1 presents the idiosyncratic volatility effect controlling for the distress risk effect.
Panel A presents the sorting results using Z-score, while Panel B uses O-score sorting. The
abnormal returns adjusted by FF-3 model are reported in percentage.
From Panel A of Table 1, there is clear evidence of a distress risk puzzle.1 The lowest
Z-score (highest distress risk) stocks earn significantly negative abnormal returns relative
to FF-3 model. More importantly, the idiosyncratic volatility effect is significant only in
the highest distress risk quintile, in the sense that only in that quintile (Z1), stocks with
high idiosyncratic volatility earn lower returns than stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility.
1Recall that a firm with a lower Z-score has a higher probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, basic finance
intuition should suggest that such firms will have higher returns to compensate for this elevated distress
risk. A similar argument holds for the high O-score firms.
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The difference in returns is of the order of −1.08% per month with a t-statistic of −2.07.
In all other distress quintiles, the spread in returns is not significantly different from zero.
The ”Before Controlling” rows show that a significant spread in returns between high and
low idiosyncratic volatility stocks is also found in the case of the whole sample, but the
magnitude of the spread is only −0.6% per month. Using O-score, the result is same as in
Panel A. In Panel B, before controlling firm’s O-score, the spread between high and low
idiosyncratic volatility stocks is significantly different from zero. The magnitude is −0.67%
per month with a t-statistic of −2.44. However, after controlling for the O-score, the spread
is only significantly different from zero in the highest O-score quintile.
The results in Table 1 clearly show that the idiosyncratic volatility effect is closely
related to the distress effect. Indeed, it actually exists conditional on high distress risk.
In the next subsection, we attempt to distinguish further the twin effects of idiosyncratic
volatility and distress, by sorting stocks in the opposite manner.
2.3 Analysis of the distress risk effect, controlling for idiosyn-
cratic volatility
By reversing the sorting order, we can assess whether the distress risk effect prevails in
the presence of idiosyncratic volatility. For this experiment, in June of each year, we first
sort stocks into five portfolios according to their idiosyncratic volatility in the past year.
Within each quintile portfolio, we then sort stocks into five groups based on their previous
December Z-score/O-score. Portfolios are held through next June and returns are value
weighted.
Table 2 presents the results. From Panel A, we can see that high distress risk(low
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Table 2: Cross-sectional distress risk effect controlled for idiosyncratic volatility
effect. Panel A presents the distress risk(proxied by Z-score) effect controlling for idiosyn-
cratic volatility effect. In ”Before Controlling” row, each June from 1981 to 2005, firms
are sorted into five quintiles according to their previous December Z-score. In ”Control-
ling for idiosyncratic volatility” panel, stocks are first sorted into five quintiles each June
based on their idiosyncratic volatility for the past year. Within each quintile, stocks are
then sorted into five groups according to their previous December Z-score. Portfolios are
value-weighted. The abnormal returns(in percengate) adjusted by FF3 model and associ-
ated robust Newey-West t-statistics are reported in percentage. The column ”1-5” refers to
the difference in monthly abnormal returns between portfolio 1(the portfolio of stocks with
highest distress risk) and portfolio 5(the lowest distress risk portfolio). Panel B repeats the
same procedure using O-score. The sample period is from 1981 to 2000.
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on Z-score controlling for idiosyncratic volatility
Ranking on Z-score
Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 1-5
Before -0.63 -0.11 -0.16 0.10 0.17 -0.80
Controlling [-4.12] [-0.84] [-1.49] [1.06] [1.52] [-4.39]
Low Vol1 -0.19 0.11 0.10 0.35 0.31 -0.50
Controlling [-1.20] [0.72] [0.69] [2.35] [1.86] [-2.34]
2 -0.50 -0.29 0.01 0.01 0.16 -0.66
for [-2.62] [-1.68] [0.05] [0.05] [0.85] [-2.44]
3 -0.72 -0.49 -0.38 -0.30 -0.46 -0.26
Idiosyncratic [-3.59] [-2.42] [-1.68] [-1.34] [-2.30] [-0.92]
4 -0.84 -0.18 -0.53 -0.51 0.07 -0.91
Volatility [-2.93] [-0.73] [-2.05] [-1.95] [0.26] [-2.60]
High Vol5 -1.22 -0.69 -0.23 -0.54 -0.21 -1.00
[-2.63] [-1.90] [-0.60] [-1.39] [-0.57] [-1.81]
Panel B: Portfolios sorted on O-score controlling for idiosyncratic volatility
Ranking on O-score
Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 5-1
Before 0.05 -0.01 -0.15 -0.41 -0.72 -0.77
Controlling [0.49] [-0.09] [-1.24] [-2.51] [-3.31] [-3.84]
Low Vol1 0.15 -0.04 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.01
Controlling [0.95] [-0.25] [0.84] [0.14] [0.84] [0.03]
2 0.06 -0.12 -0.45 -0.26 -0.23 -0.29
for [0.30] [-0.76] [-2.84] [-1.43] [-1.19] [-1.17]
3 -0.29 -0.64 -0.58 -0.91 -0.58 -0.29
Idiosyncratic [-1.39] [-2.93] [-2.70] [-3.89] [-2.24] [-0.87]
4 0.15 -0.04 -0.41 -1.02 -1.01 -1.16
Volatility [0.48] [-0.15] [-1.45] [-3.68] [-3.00] [-2.94]
High Vol5 -0.27 -0.64 -0.53 -1.27 -1.50 -1.22
[-0.78] [-1.68] [-1.43] [-3.09] [-3.64] [-2.49]
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Z-score) stocks generally earn lower returns than low distress risk stocks across idiosyn-
cratic volatility quintiles. The spread ranges from −0.3% to −1.00% per month and it is
generally statistically significant. Similar results are found when the whole sample is used,
with a spread return of −0.80% per month between high and low distress risk stocks and
a t-value of −4.39. This implies that not only does the distress risk effect exist at the
whole sample level, but it is also not subsumed by the idiosyncratic volatility effect. When
we use O-score in Panel B, the results are generally consistent with Panel A. The spread
between high and low distress risk stocks in the whole sample is −0.77% per month with
a t-statistic of −3.84. After controlling idiosyncratic volatility, the spread is significantly
different from zero within the two highest volatility quintiles. This table confirms that
idiosyncratic volatility effect cannot subsume the distress risk effect.
Taken together, the results in Table 1 and Table 2 suggest that the idiosyncratic volatil-
ity puzzle is closely related to the distress risk puzzle. In particular, the idiosyncratic
volatility effect exists conditional on the existence of high distress risk.
2.4 Further details on volatility and distress portfolios
The preceding subsection has presented material on the return characteristics of the portfo-
lios. It is also interesting to discern the volatility and distress properties of these portfolios.
Such properties are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the value-weighted Z-score and idiosyncratic volatility of
our 5x5 sorted portfolios, where volatility is controlled for distress risk. From the table,
distressed stocks (Z1) have much higher idiosyncratic volatility than healthy stocks(Z5).
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Table 3: Characteristics of 5 × 5 Idiosyncratic Volatility Portfolios Controlling
for Distress Risk. Panel A presents the characteristics of 5× 5 Z-score and idiosyncratic
volatility sorted portfolios. In June of each year from 1981 to 2005, stocks are first sorted
into five quintiles according to their previous December Z-score. Within each quintile,
stocks are then sorted into five groups on the basis of their idiosyncratic volatility for the
past year. Value-weighted Z-score and idiosyncratic volatility for each portfolio are reported
in the table. Panel B repeats the same procedure using O-score. The sample period is from
1981 to 2000.
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on idiosyncratic volatility controlling for the Z-score
Low 1 Idiosyncratic Volatility High 5
Z-score
Low 1 2.03 1.73 1.59 1.15 -0.09
3.11 3.04 3.05 3.00 2.98
Z-score 4.32 4.27 4.35 4.31 4.30
6.59 6.58 6.62 6.65 6.65
High 5 25.52 63.23 63.90 383.91 538.92
Low 1 1.61 2.39 3.20 4.42 7.27
Idiosyncratic 1.37 1.81 2.26 2.87 4.16
1.27 1.66 2.02 2.54 3.46
Volatility 1.21 1.61 1.95 2.41 3.33
High 5 1.22 1.64 2.05 2.59 3.61
Panel B: Portfolios sorted on idiosyncratic volatility controlling for the O-score
Low 1 Idiosyncratic Volatility High 5
O-score
Low 1 -3.05 -3.06 -3.16 -3.26 -3.48
-1.97 -1.96 -1.94 -1.95 -1.92
O-score -1.20 -1.15 -1.14 -1.13 -1.14
-0.40 -0.33 -0.31 -0.26 -0.22
High 5 0.97 1.26 1.23 1.95 3.25
Low 1 1.12 1.50 1.84 2.28 3.08
Idiosyncratic 1.21 1.53 1.84 2.24 3.07
1.30 1.65 1.97 2.42 3.33
Volatility 1.46 1.92 2.31 2.88 4.14
High 5 1.79 2.65 3.44 4.64 7.66
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The most striking finding is that the value weighted Z-score decreases monotonically from
low to high idiosyncratic volatility stocks only within the lowest Z-score quintile, but in-
creases monotonically from low to high idiosyncratic volatility stocks within the highest
Z-score quintile. Recall that a higher Z-score connotes financial health. Hence this finding
indicates that higher idiosyncratic volatility is associated with increased financial health,
if the firms are the most healthy. However, for the least healthy (lowest Z-score) stocks,
higher idiosyncratic volatility is associated with decreased financial health. In other words,
before we can determine whether volatility is ”good” or ”bad”, for a set of stocks in our
universe, we must first condition on whether that set of stocks is among the most or least
distressed. Remember in Panel A of Table 1, stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility earn
significantly lower returns than low idiosyncratic volatility stocks only in the lowest Z-score
quintile(distressed quintile). While Panel A of Table 3 shows that only in this distressed
quintile(Z1), high idiosyncratic volatility stocks have much lower Z-score(i.e. higher dis-
tress risk). Given the fact that distressed stocks receive anomalously lower returns, we can
see that this idiosyncratic volatility effect just reflects the distress risk effect.
Panel B presents similar results for the O-score. Same as results in Panel A, stocks
with high O-score (distressed stocks) have much higher idiosyncratic volatility than stocks
with low O-score (the most healthy stocks). The major pattern is that O-score increases
monotonically from low to high idiosyncratic volatility stocks within the highest O-score
firms, but decreases monotonically from low to high idiosyncratic volatility stocks within
the lowest O-score firms. Since high O-scores correspond to financial distress, we can say
that higher idiosyncratic volatility is associated with decreased financial health for the
most distressed stocks, and associated with increasing financial health for the most healthy
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stocks. This accords with the results of Panel A. From Panel B of Table 1, stocks with
high idiosyncratic volatility earn significantly lower returns than low idiosyncratic volatility
stocks only in the highest O-score quintile(distressed quintile). While Panel B of Table 3
shows that only in this distressed quintile(O5), high idiosyncratic volatility stocks have
much higher O-score(i.e. higher distress risk). Again, using O-score, we generate same
conclusion: the idiosyncratic volatility effect just reflects the distress risk effect.
The next table, Table 4, presents the opposite sorting, that is, distress risk controlling
for idiosyncratic volatility. In Panel A, we see that Z-score decreases monotonically (across
volatility portfolios) for the first four Z-score portfolios, and increases monotonically for the
fifth portfolio. At the same time, idiosyncratic volatility decreases monotonically from low
to high Z-score stocks only within the highest volatility quintile. A similar pattern exists
in Panel B: O-score increases monotonically for all except the lowest O-score portfolio. At
the same time, idiosyncratic volatility increases monotonically from low to high O-score
stocks only within the highest volatility quintile. This indicates that, except for the most
healthy stocks (highest Z, lowest O), financial health tends to decrease with idiosyncratic
volatility. Furthermore, idiosyncratic volatility tends to decrease with financial health only
for the most volatile stocks. Taken together, the results of Tables 3 and 4 reinforce the
idea from the previous subsection that volatility and distress effects interact at the extreme
portfolios.
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Table 4: Characteristics of 5× 5 Distress Risk Portfolios Controlling for Idiosyn-
cratic Volatility. Panel A presents the characteristics of 5 × 5 idiosyncratic volatility
and Z-score sorted portfolios. In June of each year from 1981 to 2005, stocks are first
sorted into five quintiles based on their idiosyncratic volatility for the past year. Within
each quintile, stocks are then sorted into five groups according to their previous December
Z-score. Value-weighted Z-score and idiosyncratic volatility for each portfolio are reported
in the table. Panel B repeats the same procedure using O-score. The sample period is from
1981 to 2000.
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on Z-score controlling for idiosyncratic volatility
Low 1 Z-score High 5
Idiosyncratic
Volatility
Low 1 2.72 3.96 5.30 8.06 29.13
2.34 3.57 4.84 7.17 71.18
Z-score 1.99 3.24 4.45 6.72 127.62
1.51 2.80 3.99 6.34 475.69
High 5 -0.44 1.69 2.77 4.83 949.70
Low 1 1.36 1.31 1.25 1.27 1.26
Idiosyncratic 1.77 1.76 1.76 1.75 1.75
2.20 2.21 2.18 2.21 2.21
Volatility 2.90 2.87 2.83 2.84 2.84
High 5 5.31 4.58 4.25 4.13 4.10
Panel B: Portfolios sorted on O-score controlling for idiosyncratic volatility
Low 1 O-score High 5
Idiosyncratic
Volatility
Low 1 -3.40 -2.50 -1.88 -1.31 -0.44
-3.22 -2.15 -1.54 -0.91 -0.02
O-score -3.15 -1.94 -1.18 -0.49 0.69
-3.33 -1.69 -0.81 -0.02 1.33
High 5 -2.52 -0.57 0.43 1.47 4.91
Low 1 1.05 1.05 1.10 1.10 1.15
Idiosyncratic 1.87 1.86 1.85 1.85 1.88
2.05 2.05 2.10 2.05 2.10
Volatility 2.82 2.85 2.85 2.94 2.93
High 5 3.98 4.16 4.17 4.66 5.79
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3 Rational interpretation of idiosyncratic volatility and
distress risk effects
We now investigate an intuitive, rational explanation for the twin puzzles. For simplicity,
we will call this an ”equity-bias argument”. This section is closely based on the work of
Ferguson and Shockley (2003). These researchers observe that using an equity-only proxy
for the market portfolio will understate equity betas, with the error increasing with the
firm’s leverage. Thus, firm-specific variables that correlate with leverage (such as book-
to-market and size) will appear to explain returns after controlling for proxy beta, simply
because they capture the missing beta risk.2
3.1 A corrected single-beta CAPM model
Consider a simple continuous-time economy in which the single-beta CAPM prices all real
assets, firms are allowed to finance their real assets with a simple capital structure. Under
standard assumptions, equity claims will be priced as European calls on the underlying
real assets. Let M be the market portfolio, which can be divided into two subportfolios:
the economy’s debt claims D, and the economy’s equity claims E. Then the covariance
between firm i’s equity claim Si and M is:
σSi,M =
E
M
σSi,E +
D
M
σSi,D,
2In an empirical application, the authors document that their portfolios formed on leverage and distress
can subsume the Fama-French (1993) factors SMB and HML.
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where σSi,M , σSi,E, σSi,D are the stock’s covariances with the asset, equity, and debt markets,
respectively. The true beta of firm i’s equity claim can be written as:
βSi =
σSi,M
σ2M
=
E
M
σSi,E
σ2M
+
D
M
σSi,D
σ2M
,
where σ2M , σ
2
E, σ
2
D are the return variances of the asset, equity, and debt markets, respec-
tively. If we ignore the economy’s debt claims in the construction of the market proxy, the
proxy beta of firm i’s equity will be
βˆESi =
σSi,E
σ2E
,
where the superscript E is appended to denote the proxy with respect to the equity market.
We can write the proxy equity beta as a transformation of the true equity beta:
βˆESi = Φ
−1[βSi − ΩβˆDSi], (2)
where
Φ =
E
M
σ2E
σ2M
, Ω =
D
M
σ2D
σ2M
,
and βˆDSi is the beta of the equity calculated against the economy’s debt claims only (i.e.,
the assets omitted from the market proxy). From Equation (2), we can see that the error in
the proxy equity beta (βˆESi) has two components: a scaling error Φ
−1 that is common across
all equities, and a firm-specific error −ΩβˆDSi that reflects the stock’s covariance with the
(omitted) debt claims. It is the second component, the firm-specific term, that is critical
for the researcher, because it is a function of the firm’s financial leverage. Ferguson and
19
Shockley (2003) show that the second component ΩβˆDSi is an increasing and convex function
of the firm’s leverage. Due to this convexity, the missed component effect should be more
pronounced for more distressed firms, so we care as much about relative distress as about
absolute leverage ratios. It then follows that in the cross section, the equity beta estimation
errors will not be random. They will be systematically related to the relative leverage and
relative distress of each firm in the sample. As a result, the model predicts that firm
leverage and financial distress will capture the convex beta estimation errors induced by
the use of an equity-only market proxy. This is what we refer to as an equity-bias. The
following arguments illustrate a method of removing this bias.
According to the decomposition of the firm’s equity beta in equation (2), the equilibrium
model of excess returns is:
rSi − rF = [rM − rF ]βSi = Φ[rM − rF ]βˆESi + Ω[rM − rF ]βˆDSi
Since ΩβˆDSi is a function of firm’s leverage and relative distress, the empirical solution for
correcting this beta estimation error is to create portfolios based on relative leverage and
relative distress. These factors formed on relative leverage and relative distress provide
the best complements to the equity market index for explaining the cross section of stock
returns. The corrected single beta capital asset pricing model can be expressed as:
Rei = αi + β
MKT
i R
MKT
t + β
D/E
i R
D/E
t + β
Z
i R
Z
t , t = 1, 2, · · · , T, (3)
where Rei is test asset’s excess return, R
MKT
t is the return of stock market portfolio, R
D/E
t
and RZt are returns of two portfolios to mimic the part of common return associated with
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relative leverage and the part of return associated with relative distress. Ferguson and
Shockley (2003) use this corrected single-beta CAPM to examine whether sensitivities to
returns on these portfolios help to explain the cross section of excess returns.
To construct portfolios for R
D/E
t and R
Z
t , following Ferguson and Shockley (2003), in
June of each year t, firms are assigned to one of three book debt-to-market equity(BD/ME)
portfolios based on the one-third and two-third percentile breakpoints determined only from
the NYSE firms in the sample. Independently and simultaneously, firms are assigned to
one of two portfolios: Z <= 2.675 and Z > 2.675 according to their previous December
Z-scores. Firms with Z > 2.675 are predicted to be in the healthy group, while firms with
Z <= 2.675 are predicted to be in the distressed group. Only firms with ordinary common
equity are used to form the leverage and distress portfolios. The intersection of the two
independent sorts results in six debt-to-equity(D/E)/Z portfolios. Portfolios are valued
weighted. R
D/E
t is then calculated as the simple average return of the two Z portfolios
within D/E portfolio 3(the highly levered firms) minus the simple average return of the
two Z portfolios within D/E portfolio 1(the least levered firms). Similarly, RZt is the simple
average return of the three D/E portfolios within Z portfolio 2(high Z-firms) minus the
simple average return of the three D/E portfolios within Z portfolio 1 (low Z-firms).
3.2 Testing idiosyncratic volatility and distress risk portfolios
Recall that in the previous section, we documented that the idiosyncratic volatility ef-
fect exists conditional on high distress risk. We now use tests that are motivated by the
corrected-CAPM from above to investigate a simple rational explanation for both puzzles.
Specifically, if the model (3) can explain the idiosyncratic volatility and distress risk
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Table 5: GRS test on idiosyncratic volatility portfolios and distress risk portfo-
lios. The time series regression model is: Rei = αi + β
MKT
i R
MKT
t + β
D/E
i R
D/E
t + β
Z
i R
Z
t ,
where RMKTt is the stock market excess return, R
D/E
t is the return spread between high and
low D/E portfolios, and RZt is the return spread between high and low Z portfolios. The
construction of the idiosyncratic volatility portfolios and distress risk portfolios is described
in Section 3.2. Panel A presents the GRS test on idiosyncratic portfolios. Regression coef-
ficient estimates and associated t-value, Gibbons-Ross-Shanken test statistic(F -test and χ
test) and associated p-value are reported. The sample period is from 1981 to 2005. Panel
B presents same GRS test results on Z-score portfolios from 1981 to 2005. Panel C presents
test results on O-score portfolios from 1981 to 2000. Construction of Z/O-score portfolios
is described in Section 2.
Panel A: GRS test on idiosyncratic volatility portfolios
Ranking on idiosyncratic volatility
Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 5-1 GRS-χ GRS-F
FF − α(%) 0.12 -0.04 -0.10 -0.35 -0.93 -1.05 13.33 2.15
[2.06] [-0.45] [-0.93] [-1.88] [-3.16] [-3.24] (0.04) (0.05)
α(%) 0.11 -0.06 -0.15 -0.30 -0.75 -0.86 6.40 1.03
[1.16] [-0.76] [-0.90] [-1.07] [-2.05] [-1.97] (0.38) (0.40)
βMKT 0.86 1.07 1.32 1.53 1.53 0.68
[43.13] [47.89] [35.81] [21.51] [17.15] [6.46]
βD/E 0.21 0.03 -0.28 -0.49 -0.77 -0.98
[4.24] [0.95] [-4.08] [-3.82] [-4.60] [-4.77]
βZ -0.12 0.15 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.31
[-2.67] [3.61] [3.14] [0.95] [0.78] [1.13]
Panel B: GRS test on Z-score portfolios
Ranking on Z-score
Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 1-5 GRS-χ GRS-F
FF − α(%) -0.60 -0.15 -0.15 0.10 0.18 -0.78 22.52 3.64
[-3.92] [-1.08] [-1.39] [1.02] [1.57] [-4.27] (0.00) (0.00)
α(%) -0.35 -0.01 -0.10 0.05 -0.03 -0.32 9.90 1.60
[-2.20] [-0.10] [-0.87] [0.51] [-0.29] [-1.60] (0.13) (0.15)
βMKT 1.15 1.01 0.96 0.90 0.88 0.27
[27.25] [24.43] [31.67] [33.32] [29.85] [5.78]
βD/E 0.59 0.56 0.31 0.18 -0.09 0.68
[9.16] [8.31] [6.16] [3.31] [-1.56] [8.69]
βZ -0.65 -0.40 -0.17 0.03 0.34 -0.99
[-7.35] [-4.78] [-2.67] [0.52] [5.35] [-9.43]
Panel C: GRS test on O-score portfolios
Ranking on O-score
Low 1 2 3 4 High 5 5-1 GRS-χ GRS-F
FF − α(%) 0.06 -0.02 -0.12 -0.43 -0.77 -0.83 19.69 3.15
[0.58] [-0.21] [-1.00] [-2.61] [-3.46] [-4.06] (0.00) (0.01)
α(%) -0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.30 -0.62 -0.62 8.93 1.43
[-0.01] [-0.35] [-0.71] [-1.82] [-2.70] [-2.68] (0.18) (0.20)
βMKT 0.91 0.96 1.05 1.04 1.17 0.26
[32.39] [45.24] [27.61] [20.84] [16.36] [3.79]
βD/E -0.10 0.13 0.22 0.32 0.21 0.31
[-1.45] [2.11] [3.69] [3.63] [1.93] [2.85]
βZ 0.22 0.01 -0.10 -0.28 -0.20 -0.42
[3.87] [0.19] [-1.39] [-3.25] [-1.63] [-3.50]
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puzzles, then the regression intercepts αi should be zero if we run time-series regression
tests on idiosyncratic volatility portfolios and distress risk portfolios. For this purpose,
we use the (GRS) test of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989). If the errors are i.i.d. over
time, homoskedastic, and independent of the factors, the asymptotic joint distribution of
the intercepts gives the test statstic,
T
[
1 +
(
ET (f)
σˆ(f)
)2]−1
αˆ′Σˆ−1αˆ ∼ χ2N .
We also use a finite-sample exact F test, which we now describe. When the errors are also
normally distributed, a multivariate, finite-sample counterpart statistic is
T −N −K
N
(
1 + ET (f)
′Ωˆ−1ET (f)
)−1
αˆ′Σˆ−1αˆ ∼ FN,T−N−K .
Table 5 presents the GRS test results on the idiosyncratic volatility portfolios and dis-
tress risk portfolios. To form idiosyncratic volatility portfolios and distress risk portfolios,
in June of each year, we sort stocks into five portfolios separately according to their previous
December bankruptcy scores (Z-score/O-score) and their idiosyncratic volatility–computed
from equation (1) using past year’s daily data. From Panel A, there is clear evidence of the
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. High idiosyncratic volatility stocks earn significantly lower
FF3-adjusted returns than low idiosyncratic volatility stocks. The spread is −1.05% per
month with a t-statistic of -3.24. Moreover, the GRS tests jointly reject the null hypothesis
of zero abnormal returns at 5% level. When we use the corrected single-beta capital asset
pricing model (3) to adjust the returns, the spread between high and low idiosyncratic
volatility stocks becomes not significantly different from zero. The model adjusted α is
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−0.86% per month with a t-statistic of −1.97. Checking the loadings on the regressands,
we can see that the key to interpret the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is firm’s leverage.
Loadings on RD/E are significantly different from zero, and they are decreasing monoton-
ically from low to high idiosyncratic volatility stocks. The pattern of loadings on RMKT
exacerbate the volatility effect. Loadings on RMKT actually monotonically increase from
low to high idiosyncratic volatility stocks. In support of the equity-bias arguments outlined
above, the evidence shows that firm’s leverage manages to capture the estimation errors
induced by the use of an equity-only market proxy. Both the GRS F -test and χ-test show
that we cannot jointly reject the null of zero abnormal returns across the idiosyncratic
volatility portfolios. This implies that the corrected single-beta CAPM does a good job of
explaining the idiosyncratic volatility effect.
In Panel B of Table 5, distress risk stocks (low Z-score stocks) have significantly lower
FF3-adjusted returns. The spread between low and high Z-score stocks is −0.78% per
month with a t-statistic of −4.27. Again, the joint GRS tests significantly reject the null
hypothesis of zero abnormal returns at 1% level. However, when we use the corrected
single-beta CAPM (3) to adjust stock returns, the spread between high (Z1) and low
(Z5) distressed stocks is only −0.32% per month with a t-statistic of −1.60, which is not
significantly different from zero. Moreover, the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns
across the Z-score portfolios is not rejected by the joint GRS F -test and χ tests.3 Loadings
on the RZ are generally significantly different from zero and increase monotonically from
distressed stocks (Z1) to healthy stocks (Z5). When we use O-score to form the distress risk
3Note that distressed stocks (Z1) have high loadings on the RMKT and RD/E , while healthy stocks (Z5)
have low loadings on RMKT and RD/E . So they are not the reason to explain the puzzling low returns on
distressed stocks.
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portfolios, the results are consistent with results in Panel B. Although the spread between
distressed stocks (O5) and healthy stocks (O1) is still significantly different from zero when
we use the corrected single-beta CAPM model to adjust stock returns, the GRS test cannot
reject the null hypothesis of jointly zero abnormal returns across the O-score quintiles.
The above evidence clearly shows that after we correct the beta errors in the CAPM, the
model does a good job to explain cross-sectional idiosyncratic volatility effect and distress
risk effect. And this provides a rational explanation to the idiosyncratic volatility and
distress risk puzzles.
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the link between the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle and the distress
risk puzzle, and proposes a simple, rational explanation for both puzzles. We have two
main contributions.
Our first contribution is to forge a link between the analysis of distress risk and volatil-
ity risk. Sequential sorting indicates that after controlling for distress risk, stocks with
high idiosyncratic volatility earn significantly low returns only in the highest distress risk
quintile. This implies that the idiosyncratic volatility effect exists conditional on the high
distress risk. At the same time, distress risk seems to exist independently of idiosyncratic
volatility effects. In other words, volatility and distress risk are linked, with the volatility
effect being dependent on elevated levels of distress.
Our second contribution is to provide a simple explanation for both puzzles. We imple-
ment a corrected CAPM model, based on the analysis of Ferguson and Shockley (2003). In
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this framework, we document that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal
returns across either idiosyncratic volatility or distress risk portfolios.
Why should we care about these results? From an asset pricing viewpoint, the reason
is that we have made strides towards addressing the question of the importance of distress
risk raised, for example, by Fama and French (1993). In this regard, an attractive feature
of our research is that we test an empirical model of distress risk that is grounded in a
transparent CAPM framework. From an investment perspective, the reason is that we
have clarified a substantial part of the relation between volatility and distress risk, and
thus provided an important insight into the mechanism of financial hardship.
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